![]() ![]() In early 2007, with thousands of Iraqis dying each month-and weeks after firing Rumsfeld-President Bush finally approved a “surge” of 20,000 more troops, averting a complete debacle and suppressing the violence long enough to allow American forces to move quietly over the border. So the number of attacks would go on rising, the number of deaths mounting, and within two years of this Oval Office conclave the impossible would come to pass: the United States and “the most powerful military the world had ever known,” a half-decade after having been attacked by nineteen suicide hijackers, and thanks largely to its own self-inflicted wounds, found itself on the verge of military defeat. Rumsfeld, domineering, wily, powerful, had maintained from the start that the US should be withdrawing soldiers, not adding them-the Americans needed to “take our hands off the bicycle seat” and let the Iraqis learn to ride on their own-and his generals, Sanchez included, knew better than to ask. The proconsul’s “amazing” request, meantime, while on its face overdue-more troops are needed in Iraq, which is careening toward civil war-is a political shadow game: Bremer will soon leave his post and his “close-hold memorandum,” as Rice implies, will accomplish little more than letting him claim that he at least had demanded more troops. The secretary of defense, to whom he also supposedly reports, feels compelled to act out his shock and regret before the president. Paul Bremer, secretly demands that 30,000 more soldiers be sent to Iraq, having neglected to mention this to the general who actually commands American forces there or to the president’s national security adviser, to whom Bremer supposedly reports. I’ll take care of responding to him.” 2Ī perfect little chamber play of dysfunction: the American proconsul in Baghdad, L. President, you don’t have to do anything. “Well, this is amazing,” said Rumsfeld, shaking his head negatively. President, you ought to be glad he didn’t send it to you, because now you don’t have to respond,” said Rice. “Well, why didn’t he go through the military?” asked Bush, who seemed visibly upset. ![]() ![]() Then turning toward Abizaid and me, he asked, “Have you guys seen this?”īush then addressed Condoleezza Rice, to whom Bremer reported. President, I just received a close-hold memorandum from Ambassador Bremer requesting that two additional divisions be deployed to Iraq.” Everybody is okay.’ That’s who this guy is, Mr. “When I called him up to ask how he was, his immediate response was, ‘Hey, sir, no big deal…. President, Ric’s convoy was hit by an IED about ten days ago,” he said. Abizaid and I greeted several other presidetial advisors in the room and then sat down on the couch to the left of Bush. I barely noticed as a photographer snapped our picture. President Bush, who was already standing, stepped forward and shook my hand. Once inside the Oval Office, General Sanchez tells us in his memoir: On a lovely morning in May 2004, as occupied Iraq slipped deeper into a chaos of suicide bombings, improvised explosive attacks, and sectarian warfare, the American commander in Baghdad, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, together with his superior, General John Abizaid of Central Command, arrived at the White House for an appointment with the president. He’s a mystery to me, and in many ways, he remains a mystery to me-except for the possibility that there might not be a mystery. ![]() An Allied soldier and Iraqi looters, Basra, Iraq, Ap1. ![]()
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